On Wednesday, the winners of this year’s Pwnie Awards were announced in a ceremony following the first full day of conference briefings. Among those walking away with the My Little Pony awards in hand were Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek (Jeep hack), Tavis Ormandy (Antivirus vulnerabilities), and Peiter Zatko (.Mudge) (Lifetime Achievement).
Before, however, a group of hacker all-stars gathered for a group photo.
And now, without further delay, are the winners direct from the Pwnie Award site:
Awarded to the researchers who discovered or exploited the most
technically sophisticated and interesting server-side bug. This
includes any software that is accessible remotely without using
Cisco’s ASA (Ancient Security Architecture) firewalls had a
vulnerability in their IKE fragment re-assembly that permitted
remote unauthenticated heap memory corruption. Thanks to a
lack of non-executable memory and ASLR protections, these
Exodus researchers were able to turn this vulnerability into
an epic win just as if they were exploiting a late 90’s Linux
box. It just turns out that this late 90’s Linux box happens
to be your firewall/NIDS/VPN/IRC Bouncer. Yay.
Awarded to the researchers who discovered or exploited the most
technically sophisticated and interesting client-side bug.
This vulnerability was discovered when SSH kept segfaulting
when a Google engineer tried to connect to a particular
host. Rather than being a bug in SSH, it turned out that
Google has ridiculously long internal hostnames that cause
stack buffer overflows in glibc’s DNS resolution code. They
also have some ridiculously talented security engineers who
were able to bypass modern Linux security mitigations like
ASLR and exploit this bug.
Awarded to the researchers who discovered or exploited the most
technically sophisticated and interesting privilege escalation
vulnerability. These vulnerabilities can include local operating
system privilege escalations, operating system sandbox escapes,
and virtual machine guest breakout vulnerabilities.
The best part about platforms building new layers of privilege
with Trusted Execution Environments is that they all present
new opportunities for wicked cool privilege escalation
vulnerabilities. While Intel is down to somewhere around Ring
-37, ARM-based platforms are catching up quickly. A mysterious
porcupine slash hacker slash blogger has spent the last year
documenting a privilege escalation chain from zero privileges
to full dumping of FDE keys outta TrustZone. The exploitation
of this vulnerability in the Widevine DRM-protected video
trustlet was a work of art and it deserves a video of a round
of applause displayed through a hardware-protected video path
that fully protects the rights of the content owner
Awarded to the researchers who discovered the most impactful
cryptographic attack against real-world systems, protocols, or
algorithms. This isn’t some academic conference where we care
about theoretical minutiae in obscure algorithms, this category
requires actual pwnage.
DROWN is the Mark Dowd Flash Exploit of crypto attacks. It is
one of the all-time great papers not just in crypto
exploitation, but in exploitation period.
Start here: almost everyone working in software security knows
that if you encrypt a message and then don’t authenticate the
resulting ciphertext, you’ve got problems. If you encrypt with
a block cipher in CBC mode, which is how everyone encrypted
until like 5 minutes ago, you have a problem with a name: a
Among all the viable crypto attacks you can pull off with a
laptop to get a game-over serverside flaw with, there are two
that you can count on a strong pentester to actually know
about: hash length extension and the CBC padding oracle.
What a lot of strong pentesters don’t know is that the padding
oracle attack that breaks AES in CBC mode also breaks RSA. The
attack is trickier, but not that much trickier, and when you
pull it off you join a secret society of people who get to
make dumb jokes based on the name “Bleichenbacher”. We have a
So, DROWN exploits the Bleichenbacher RSA padding oracle
against TLS. Easy peasy, lemon squeezy, right?
Wrong. There is neither pease nor squeeze to be found anywhere
To start with: the Bleichenbacher oracle doesn’t work against
SSL 3.0 or TLS. And SSL 3.0 or TLS is what everyone uses. But
DROWN still works. Why?
Because people still have SSL 2.0 servers stood up on the
Internet. They don’t use them. They’re not even aware that
they’re there. But they are, and because people are lazy, they
have the same certificates and keys installed as the TLS
servers do. DROWN takes advantage of that: it’s a
In the DROWN attack, attackers start a handshake with a TLS
server, and then quickly shuttle the victim’s TLS messages to
an SSL 2 server. SSL 2 is vulnerability to RSA oracles, and
can be used as a cross-protocol oracle.
But wait: there’s more. SSL 2.0 is not the same protocol as
TLS. It can’t do anything with TLS ciphertexts. But there’s an
extension to the RSA padding oracle attack that takes
advantage of RSA malleability. The same malleability that
allows attackers to do the number-theoretic equivalent of
flipping bits in a CBC ciphertext also allows attackers to
*tune* their corrupted TLS RSA ciphertexts.
The DROWN attack takes advantage of an optimization Bardou
used for fast padding oracle attacks against embedded hardware
to adapt TLS messages to SSL 2.0, and then use SSL 2.0’s
vulnerability to padding oracles to decrypt them.
It’s among the coolest attack papers I’ve ever read. Let’s
pretend, just for this one Pwnies event, that it had better
branding than Badlock.
Awarded to the researchers who introduced or discovered the most
subtle, technically sophisticated, or impactful backdoor in widely
used software, protocols, or algorithms.
Although many vendors intentionally backdoor their products,
because they hate their users, some companies have to rely on
the cyberwarfare divisions of global powers to do so. In late
2015, Juniper issued an advisory claiming that “unauthorized”
code in the Netscreen operating system had been active for the
last few years. Netscreen firewalls are externally exposed by
their very nature and it wasn’t long before two sets of issues
In a nod to grunge 90s, a SSH backdoor was added that allowed
anyone (mostly China) to login to a Netscreen device over SSH
using a hardcoded backdoor. The security firms who published
the details did so knowing that far too many sysadmins were
stuck at their in-laws over the December holidays and looking
for any excuse to spend some quality time in a dark room by
The second issue was far more interesting. In an attempt to
make all of the privacy crazies^W^W crypto activists feel
better about themselves, the Dual_EC RNG constant hardcoded
into the Netscreen firmware was changed from one mysterious
constant to another. Juniper hasn’t clarified whether the
first constant was a backdoor as well, but it is safe to
assume that the entire Netscreen platform should be gently
lowered into a volcano at this point.
Eight months later, not much is publicly known about how these
backdoors were added, or which Juniper developer has a storage
unit full of Chinese tiger penis wine as a result.
Awarded to the researchers, their PR team, and participating
journalists for the best, most high-profile, and fear-inducing
public spectacle that resulted in the most panic-stricken phone
calls from our less-technical friends and family members. Bonus
points for it being a needlessly sophisticated attack against a
needlessly Internet-enabled “Thing.”
They may not have been the first
but in our not-so-biased opinion, Charlie and Chris wore it
best. The car hacking papers from researchers at UCSD and UW
just lacked sufficient…
Andy Greenberg freaking out.
This high-profile demo caused Chrysler to
1.4M vehicles in order to address the vulnerabilities that
Charlie and Chris identified. More importantly, it
demonstrated to the entire industry how expensive not properly securing
smart vehicles’ systems could be and that proper software
security programs just might be a good idea.
Sometimes the most important part of security research is how you
market and sell the vulnerability you discovered. Who cares how
impactful the actual vulnerability is, what matters is how sweet
your logo turns out!
This team didn’t stop at the named vulnerability or the
prostyle logo, they produced a 3 minute video outlining the
threat of this issue. The video looks impressive including
slow motion hacker walking and on screen typing. The voice
over, pimping the Bastille team, is not as impressive.
Basically, if you can get close to a target that is using a
non-bluetooth wireless keyboard or mouse, and not have the
victim look at their screen, you’re golden. The movie
highlights a victim on the phone but unaware of his computer
screen while another victim leaves for coffee. Oscar award
winning performances all around. This came in with a CVSS
score of 2.9 which is about the same as not using a password
Awarded to the researchers, attackers, defenders, executives,
journalists, nobodies, randos, or trolls for pulling off something
so truly epic that we couldn’t possibly have predicted it by
creating an award category that did it justice.
Awarded to the person who published the most interesting and
innovative research in the form of a paper, presentation, tool or
even a mailing list post.
Memory deduplication, a well-known technique to reduce the
memory footprint across virtual machines, is now also a
default-on feature inside the Windows 8.1 and Windows 10
operating systems. Deduplication maps multiple identical
copies of a physical page onto a single shared copy with
copy-on-write semantics. As a result, a write to such a shared
page triggers a page fault and is thus measurably slower than
a write to a normal page. Prior work has shown that an
attacker able to craft pages on the target system can use this
timing difference as a simple single-bit side channel to
discover that certain pages exist in the system.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the deduplication side
channel is much more powerful than previously assumed,
potentially providing an attacker with a weird machine to read
arbitrary data in the system. We first show that an attacker
controlling the alignment and reuse of data in memory is able
to perform byte-by-byte disclosure of sensitive data (such as
randomized 64 bit pointers). Next, even without control over
data alignment or reuse, we show that an attacker can still
disclose high-entropy randomized pointers using a birthday
attack. To show these primitives are practical, we present an
Edge browser, in absence of software bugs and with all
defenses turned on. Our attack combines our deduplication-based
primitives with a reliable Rowhammer exploit to gain arbitrary
memory read and write access in the browser.
cross-process system-wide exploitation (using the popular
nginx web server as an example) and discussing mitigation
Awarded to the vendor who mis-handled a security
vulnerability most spectacularly.
Western Digital is no stranger to redundancy in the context of data
integrity, and they’re not cutting any corners in applying those lessons
to their cryptographic failures. Their firmware is rich with layers of
keys resting adjacent to ciphertext, like a matryoshka doll of plaintext
surprises. The most impressive part is that you don’t need to be a
firmware extraction connoisseur to benefit from the rewards of their
abundant “data recovery” options; take comfort in knowing that the
keys themselves are actually just redundant copies of a 32bit rand()
value repeated over and over, making the keys impossible to lose!
In response, the good folks at WD “continue to evaluate the observations”,
possibly the most indecipherable output they’ve ever produced.
Awarded to the person who discovered a bug resulting in the most
hype on the Internets and in the traditional media. Extra points
for bugs that turn out to be impossible to exploit in practice.
What kind of awards ceremony does not have an award for best
This cover of Sia’s “Chandalier” was the keynote of Kiwicon 2015, where
it was combined with interpretive dance to artistically summarize the deep
geopolitical tensions surrounding cyberwar, attribution, and the Wassenaar
Sometimes giving 110% just makes your FAIL that much more epic. And
what use would the Internet be if it wasn’t there to document this FAIL for
all time? This award is to honor a person or company’s spectacularly epic
It turned out that 2015-2016 was the first year that everyone
everywhere won at security all year round. Either that or the
Internet didn’t give us enough good nominations for this
category. It’s most probably the first one, though.
Most hackers have the personality of a supermodel who does
discrete mathematics for fun. Like mathematicians, hackers get off
on solving very obscure and difficult to even explain
problems. Like models, hackers wear a lot of black, think they are
more famous than they are, and their career effectively ends at
age 30. Either way, upon entering one’s third decade, it is time
to put down the disassembler and consider a relaxing job in
Peiter C. Zatko, one time L0pht frontman and author of
fundamental hacking tools including L0phtcrack is a long-time
vulnerability research educator and influencer. He is well
known for leading L0pht’s 1998 senate testimony about the end
of the world as we know it, which ended up with the US Govt
trusting this hacker enough to allow him to control DARPA’s
cyber security program. Like most security researchers Mudge
also did his time at Google, but has since returned to the
beltway to help establish a cyber consumer reports magazine
service, apparently by request of the White House.
0wnage, measured in owws, can be delivered in mass quantities to a
single organization or distributed across the wider Internet
population. The Epic 0wnage award goes to the hackers responsible
for delivering the most damaging, widely publicized, or hilarious
0wnage. This award can also be awarded to the researcher
responsible for disclosing the vulnerability or exploit that
resulted in delivering the most owws across the Internet.
Backdooring cryptographic routines makes them fragile,
especially when you are trying to hide said backdoor as a neat
coincidence between leaking a lot of key data, failing to use
the normal default Q value, and just generally sucking at
security engineering. We’re not saying Juniper was backdoored
to start with, we’re just saying, hey, what a neat
coincidence, and we respect the amount of work that went
into that coincidence.
And the genius of the hackers who REBACKDOORED the backdoor is
that all they had to do is change one simple number, the fake
Q number, and nobody even noticed, because “Hey, we can’t
decrypt that stream? Whatever. More where that came from.” is
the standard SIGINT response.
Then later, they added an admin/password backdoor, just in
case they didn’t have passive collection around a site, and
wanted to get more active access.
Hat’s off to you, unknown (Russian) hackers.
There’s no CVE for this issue because CVE is dead.